



**RIPE NCC**

RIPE NETWORK COORDINATION CENTRE

# Internet Data Analysis with RIPE RIS

BGP Crash Course


Emile Aben | 2022 | TMA PhD School

# What Is BGP?




- BGP = Border Gateway Protocol
- The Internet control plane
- Distributes Internet routing information between routers
  - iBGP: Routers within the same administrative domain
  - eBGP: Between different admin domains (Autonomous Systems, ASN)
- BGP deals with external routing, other protocols deal with internal routing
  - Internal Gateway Protocol (IGP)
  - Examples: OSPF, IS-IS

# How It Works (Simplified)




10.1.2.0/24

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


10.1.2.0/24


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
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





# How It Works (Simplified)



?



# How It Works (Simplified)



# BGP Route Selection



- Best Path Selection Algorithm
  - How does AS1 select the best path for 10.1.2.0/24?
- Selection criteria
  1. Local preference (stays internal to a network)
  2. Shortest AS path
  3. Closest next hop router (aka hot potato routing)
  4. Additional criteria, breaking ties

# RIB vs. FIB





- Each router has a
  - Routing Information Base (RIB): Database of all routes + metadata (AS\_PATH, etc.)
  - Forwarding Information Base (FIB): Database on how to forward packets
- Best route for a prefix gets installed into FIB
- RIB
  - 10.1.2.0/24 AS1 AS2 AS3 AS4 AS5 AS6 AS7
  - 10.1.2.0/24 AS3 AS4 AS5 AS6 AS7
  - 10.1.2.0/23 AS6 AS7
- FIB
  - 10.1.2.0/24 via AS3
  - 10.1.2.0/23 via AS6
- How will traffic for 10.1.2.1 be routed?

# Routing Symmetry?



- BGP routing does not have to be symmetric!




Images from: <https://www.noction.com/blog/bgp-and-asymmetric-routing>

# Hot Potato Routing



- Get traffic off your network as quickly as possible
  - In BGP you only see the BGP adjacency
- Some networks do “cold potato”
  - Costs more
  - You have better control of the quality of the path (packet drop, latency)




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# Local Policy Matters



- Customer - Provider
  - Money in exchange for access to (typically) all of the Internet
- Peer (“bypass”)
  - (Typically) no money, mutual exchange of a limited set of Internet routes

| Received From | Advertised To |
|---------------|---------------|
| Customer      | Everyone      |
| Peer          | Customer      |
| Provider      | Customers     |



# “BGP Is An Information Hiding Protocol”



- BGP will not provide you with a full picture of all available routes!
  - You don't see default routes, static routes
  - BGP speakers do not always forward paths for a prefix they know
    - Local policy (\$\$)
    - Filtering (RPKI, IRR)
  - If a BGP speaker forwards, it forwards only best path, not all
    - The further you are from a BGP router, the more chance you miss available routes when collecting BGP data
- BGP scales well



# BGP Is Simple and Complex




- Protocol itself is relatively simple
- Internet: 900k+ IPv4 prefixes, 150k+ IPv6 prefixes, 70k+ ASNs
- Routing policy that can be created with it is complex
- Large ASNs can (and will!) have policies that are different between different parts of their networks

# Example: Youtube Hijack



- Usual route to Youtube (AS36561)



# Example: Youtube Hijack



- Pakistan Government orders block of a YouTube video

**PTA**

**Corrigendum- Most Urgent**

**GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN**  
**PAKISTAN TELECOMMUNICATION AUTHORITY**  
**ZONAL OFFICE PESHAWAR**  
Plot-11, Sector A-3, Phase-V, Hayatabad, Peshawar.  
Ph: 091-9217279- 5829177 Fax: 091-9217254  
[www.pta.gov.pk](http://www.pta.gov.pk)

NWFP-33-16 (BW)/06/PTA February ,2008

Subject: **Blocking of Offensive Website**

Reference: *This office letter of even number dated 22.02.2008.*

I am directed to request all ISPs to immediately block access to the following website

URL: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o3s8jtvvg00>

IPs: 208.65.153.238, 208.65.153.253, 208.65.153.251

Compliance report should reach this office through return fax or at email

YouTube


stan  
com

Multinet  
Pakistan

# Example: Youtube Hijack




- What probably should have happened



# Example: Youtube Hijack



- What PK telecom ended up doing



# Timeline



## Timeline: Sunday, 24 February 2008

- Before, during and after the event: AS36561 (YouTube) announces 208.65.152.0/22 and other prefixes
- **18:47** AS17557 (Pakistan Telecom) announces 208.65.153.0/24. Routers around the world redirect YouTube traffic to Pakistan.
- **20:07** (YouTube) announces 208.65.153.0/24. BGP policy rules, such as preferring the shortest AS path, determine which route is chosen. (Pakistan Telecom) continues to attract some of YouTube's traffic.
- **20:18** (YouTube) announces 208.65.153.128/25 and 208.65.153.0/25. Every router that receives these announcements will send the traffic to YouTube.
- **21:01** AS3491 (PCCW Global) withdraws all prefixes originated by AS17557 (Pakistan Telecom), thus completely stopping the hijack of 208.65.153.0/24.

1 hour 30min. of downtime reported by users in Germany, China, US, Russia, the UK, and Australia